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Labor Law and Its Reform
Agendafor Reform: The Future of Employment Relationships and the Law. By
William B. Gould IV. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993. Pp. x, 313.
Reviewed by DanielJ. Gifford*
In Agenda for Reform: The Future of Employment Relationships and the Law,
William B. Gould IV, President Clinton's Chair of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) and former Stanford University law professor,
outlines his views on the present state of labor legislation and recommends
directions for reform. In his words, the book addresses "the central issues
confronting the employee-employer relationship today."' Although Agenda
for Reform perceptively presents a number of controversial issues involving
employment relationships in insightful ways, it addresses these matters in
isolation. Consequently, the book fails to adequately identify the "central
issues." Gould's book takes a politically moderate, incrementalist approach
to labor law reform. He assumes that the basic structure of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) will remain in its present form and proposes
amendments and other legislative changes to solve specific problems.
While this is a legitimate approach, Gould confronts social and economic
problems in need of drastic remedial action too cautiously.
Undeniably, the laws governing employment relationships are in
disarrak and in urgent need of reform. The NLRA, originally established in
1935 to oversee the unionization of the work force, has long since lost its
primary raison d'etre. Even the Taft-Hartley Amendments, intended to make
the NLRB resemble an impartial referee in the great struggles between
powerful unions and powerful employers, have lost their primary mission.2
Following the path marked out by Marver Bernstein in the 1950s,
intervening events have undermined the assumptions on which the NLRA
and Taft-Hartley Act were based. The NLRB is now floundering, without a
dear sense of an overriding goal. Meanwhile, industrial unions are in
decline, and it is no longer dear (as it was in the 1930s) that unionization
is the wave of the future or that the union movement will raise the
economic status of the working class.

* Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B., Holy
Cross College; J.D., Harvard University;, J.S.D., Columbia University. The author gratefully
acknowledges helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review by Professors Stephen
Befort, Jim Chen, Laura Cooper, Daniel A. Farber, and Leo Raskind.
1. William B. Gould IV, Agenda for Reform: The Future of Employment Relationships
and the Law at ix (1993).
2. Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (1955).
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The weakness in this book lies not in its call for reform, but in the
limited nature of its recommendations and in its failed vision. Gould sees
dearly the erosion of the union movement and treats particular symptoms
of that erosion. He fails, however, to come forward with a comprehensive
approach to reform. For example, Gould sees a need for employment
security, and because of the declining state of organized labor, Gould
focuses on the developing law of wrongful discharge to provide that
security. He sees the legislative proposals of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws s and possible federal wrongful discharge legislation as
meeting this need.
Gould recognizes that worker participation in production decisions is,
or can be, part of a wider strategy involving labor-management
cooperation, benefiting both groups. Indeed, such strategies are almost
imperative now that U.S. businesses are global competitors. This new
cooperative model is gradually replacing the older adversarial model
characterized largely by management production decisions subject to
union-imposed work rules.
Gould appreciates the benefits of the new model. He extols the
cooperative arrangements in place at General Motors' Saturn plant and the
General Motors-Toyota joint venture in Fremont, California.4 Yet the
NLRA may impede movement towards this new cooperative model. Gould
recognizes that the rationale for the 1992 NLRB decision in Electromation5
threatens employer-instituted quality work circles. He also observes that the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the phrase "managerial
employees" in NLRB v. Yeshiva Union' may raise an additional obstacle to
increased employee participation in workplace decisions.
Gould properly deplores the processes of the NLRB and the
associated judicial review as unduly time-consuming and litigious. These
processes work perversely from the perspective of the Act, delaying the
commencement of collective bargaining and, in the process, undermining
the position of the union. In the 1930s, when the NLRA was enacted,
Congress expected government agencies like the NLRB to act swiftly and
efficiently to implement the goals of recently passed legislation. The TaftHartley Act may have reinforced the NLRB's bureaucratic inertia. This Act
transformed the NLRB from an agency with a mandate to protect collective

3. Model Employment Termination Act, 7A U.LA. 73 (Supp. 1994).
4. The name of that venture is New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc.
5. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L1-B. 990, 997 (1992); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 897 (1993) (confirming the interpretation of the NILRA which casts

doubt on the lawfulness of worker-employer quality circles). The Labor Board's decisions in
these cases were grounded in part upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in NLRB v. Cabot

Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959). In a concurring opinion in Etearomation, Board Member
Raudabaugh discussed the legislative history of the NLRA, concluding that the original NLRA
Imposed an adversarial model on labor relations but that subsequent legislation may provide

grounds for Incorporating cooperative elements into labor relations. See Electromation, Inc.,
309 N.L.RB. at 1011-13 (Raudabaugh, concurring).
6. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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bargaining activities of labor into an agency monitoring both labor and
management. At any rate, Gould's criticisms of the torpid pace of both
NLRB and court procedures merely echo earlier critiques!
Interim events, in addition to the Taft-Hartley Amendments, have
altered the public's view of the NLRB and its work. Academic insights into
the operation of regulatory agencies combined with the popularization of
regulatory "capture" by Ralph Nader and others have drastically altered the
context in which regulatory agencies operate.8 The NLRB is subject to a
gamut of influences: It is an old agency that no longer reaps much
guidance from the circumstances surrounding its creation; it shares with
other agencies a tendency to "satifice" (rather than to maximize or to
excel); like all agencies, it is subject to a variety of external political, and
internal bureaucratic, influences. The NLRB invariably muddles through,
rarely using its rulemaking power or taking a comprehensive look at the
larger context in which it acts, and consequently it fails to recognize major
paradigm changes in employer-employee relations taking place around it.
As pointed out below, the recent Electromation and Du Pont cases confirm
the NLRB's attachment to the status quo.
The NLRB, of course, cannot be "captured" in the traditional sense
because it continuously deals with two major, opposing interest groups,
organized labor and management, each of which zealously approaches the
issues that concern it. Yet the underlying enabling legislation itself reflects
the shifting legislative influences of organized labor and employer
coalitions in 1935, 1947, and thereafter. At the same time, American labor
legislation ignores the interests of the unorganized, the unemployed, and
those for whom the labor market could provide a path out of poverty.
Moreover, the institutions of labor-management interaction that have
grown up around the NLRA since the mid-1930s shape and confine the
NLRB's perceptions. As a result, the NLRB is unable to free itself from the
adversarial model of labor relations when circumstances present the

7. Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old Board Learn New
Tricks?, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 9, 20 (1987); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1796 (1983).
8. See Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and
Refinements, 68 Minn. L Rev. 299, 312-19 (1983) (describing criticisms of regulatory agency
behavior). Academic critiques of agency behavior include Bernstein's work in the 1950s, the
revelations of March and Simon on organizational behavior, the impulse to "satisfying"
behavior, Lindblom's "muddling through" analysis, Mancur Olson's insights into interestgroup behavior, and modern policy choice theory. See generally Bernstein, supra note 2
(proposing a "life cycle" theory of agency behavior); James G. March & Herbert A. Simon,
Organizations (1958) (describing how internal formal and informal structures of bureaucratic
interaction affect organizational behavior); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action
(1965) (proposing a theory of interest-group behavior and its impact on government); Charles
Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79 (1959) (proposing a
theory of why agencies act incrementally). On public choice, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Law and Public Choice (1991) (exploring the ramifications of public choice theory
on the legal system).
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possibility of a different paradigm, as in Electromation. The NLRB blames
the statute for its inflexibility, but the NLRB lacks the imagination and
creativity to transform the existing law into a structure tolerating
cooperation and innovation.
Gould understands the need to reform the underlying legislation to
overcome not only the problems raised by Electromation, but numerous
other problems as well. His imagination fails, however, in addressing the
role of labor and labor organizations in the larger context of the economic
system as a whole. For example, although Gould would forbid permanent
replacement of strikers, 9 he disfavors the Quebec labor-law provision
prohibiting employers from operating during strikes. He also actively
criticizes Ontario legislation barring employers from using the services of a
bargaining-unit employee during a strike. Yet these Canadian approaches
differ only in degree from his own position.
Furthermore, Gould does not consider how differences in the overall
structure of labor relations affect the socio-economic repercussions of bans
on permanent replacements in different nations. In the United States,
labor unions advocate a ban on permanent replacements to strengthen
their positions as bargaining agents. This addition to union negotiating
power might nudge up the wage structure in heavily organized industries,
but would not respond to many social concerns which are addressed in
other societies that do ban permanent replacements. The different
industrial and social contexts prevailing in other nations may make their
experience inapt for assessing the advisability of incorporating particular
provisions of their laws into United States labor law. Indeed, the historic
industry-wide focus of American labor organization-a focus which is now
unraveling-mandates that proposed changes in American labor law be
evaluated in the light of their likely effects in the American setting.
Industrial unions in the United States traditionally have focused on
organizing particular industries and have tended to seek identical contract
terms from all the industry's employers. Leading unions such as the United
Auto Workers, the United Steelworkers, the United Textile Workers, and
the United Mine Workers have followed this industry-wide strategy.10 In
the mid-1980s, the industry-wide focus began to break down in the steel
industry. The well-publicized, recent dispute between the United Auto

9. Thus, Gould advocates the legislative abolition of the so-called Madway rule. The
Machay rule originated in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938)
(indicating that the NLRA did not prohibit employers from replacing workers striking for
economic benefits). In support of his position, Gould notes that the International Labor
Organization (ILO) conventions-to which the United States does not adhere-guarantee
workers the right to strike without fear of replacement. He further notes that these ILO
norms are widely respected in the industrialized world.

10. Many of these unions, however, have extended their membership to industries
outside the area of their traditional concerns. This fact does not detract from the point that,

within each industry In which the union is active, the union's objective is identical contract
terms with each of the major employers. See Richard B. Freeman &James L. Medoff, What Do
Unions Do? 36-37 (1984) (describing union contract objectives).
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Workers and Caterpillar may portend further breakdown in other
industries.
The traditional industry-wide focus of labor relations has also been
undercut by the increasing importance of unorganized components. These
include the Japanese transplants in the automobile industry and new
minimills, such as Nucor, in the steel industry. There also exists a
traditional unorganized segment in the textile industry and a growing
nonunion segment in the coal industry. These nonunion segments
currently constrain union-employer bargaining in varying degrees, and
their influence is likely to grow.
The operation of this historic industry-wide structure of labor
relations and its current erosion should be the focal points for labor-law
reform. My criticism of Gould's position on banning striker replacements is
based upon his failure to explore the economic and social effects of such a
ban in the American setting.
As suggestedt below, a ban on replacing strikers would become vastly
less controversial in a revised collective-bargaining system in which unionemployer negotiation across industries (as opposed to industry-wide or
firm-wide negotiation) is encouraged and in which government actively
ensures that concerns of the larger society in expanded employment,
international competitiveness, and price stability are respected.
Gould's views of why society should be concerned about labor and
labor organization, while unobjectionable, are limited in scope. He fails,
for example, to address fundamental questions about how to determine
the overall return to labor. His focus on labor and labor organization is
largely limited to an analysis of the value of collective-bargaining as a
process that facilitates worker participation in decisions affecting their
environment. Unions exist, in Gould's view, to provide an array of
workplace protections ranging from job allocation based on seniority to
protection against arbitrary discharge. Commenting on recent case law
developments in the wrongful-discharge area, Gould suggests that
protections negotiated through employer-union bargaining are often
superior in their design to the judicially or legislatively imposed substitutes
that sometimes emerge when unions are absent. Finally, Gould believes
that unions perform a social service to all workers when they exert their
political power to back social-welfare and civil rights laws.
On the other side, Gould acknowledges certain negative aspects of
labor organization in its present form, such as the "monopoly wage effece'
of industry-wide unions and the "undesirable consequences for resource
allocation"' of that wage effect. He also recognizes the potential for cost-

11. Gould, supra note 1, at 54. The "monopoly wage effect" refers to the fact that when a
union organizes an entire industry, it controls the supply of industry-specific labor. As a
consequence, the union can force the industry wage level significantly above the competitive
wage level. In the absence of competition from abroad, the higher wage costs will be reflected
in the prices of the industry's products.
A competitive economy allocates goods and services on the basis of their respective
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push inflation and the disruption resulting from prolonged strikes or labor
unrest.1 2 These matters pose challenges for the design of the labor law of
the future. Unfortunately, Gould does not grapple with these challenges in
this book.
We should approach labor law reform with both an awareness of the
problems to which earlier Congresses responded and a sensitivity to the
problems of today. The primary articulated reason for the NLRA was to
facilitate industrial peace, thereby avoiding disruption of the production
process."3 The legal protection of organizing behavior and of the right to
strike were means of fostering collective bargaining and, paradoxically, of
reducing labor's need to resort to strikes.
Another major reason for enacting the NLRA was to route more
income to the classes who would spend more and therefore increase
demand.' 4 Society surely ought to be concerned that the working class
prosper, but the reasons behind the NLRA are now obsolete. In the 1930s,
the perceived problem was that American society spent too little and saved
too much. In the 1990s, the opposite is true. Moreover, the adversarial
model on which the NLRA is built may no longer be the best way to
facilitate labor peace. We need to rethink the basic assumptions upon
which our labor law is premised. 5
16
Although Gould admits that the NLRA's rationale may be wanting,
he only partially responds to these matters. He would amend the law to
allow quality work circles and other forms of labor-management
cooperation on the plant floor and would like to see a broad transformation in labor relations away from the highly adversarial traditional model.
He looks to European and Japanese institutional and customary practices,

prices. When a union is successful in forcing the industry wage level significantly higher than
the competitive level and the prices of that industry's products reflect those high wage costs,
fewer such goods will be purchased. In this manner, the "monopoly wage effect" of industrywide unions distort the allocation of resources.
12. Id. at 32. Cost-push inflation results when higher wage costs force prices to rise.
Sometimes this occurs in a spiral: increasing wage costs force up prices. Higher prices induce

unions to demand higher wages.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 125, 128
(1944); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
14. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)) (referring to this objective); see also S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3-4 (1935)(same); 79 Cong. Rec. 7567-68 (1935)(same); 78 Cong. Rec. 9061, 12,018

(1934) (describing the same objective).
15. The present law is based upon the following assumptions common to the 1930s: The
domestic market is largely isolated from the effects of international competition; mass
production of goods of medium-range quality will guarantee success in the market; and the
U.S. economy will benefit from a diversion of savings into consumption. As pointed out in
text, the environment in which labor law operates has changed enormously since the 1930s.
Today, we need a labor law designed to operate in a world characterized, inter alia, by rapid
technological change and intense competition.
16. Gould, supra note 1, at 31.
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but finds these have little to offer to the North American context 7 Gould
thus offers little hope for bringing about this transformation in the United
States.
This reviewer suggests that, first, an affirmation that the working
classes are entitled to a "fair' share of this society's productivity might aid
our approach to the basic issue of labor's role in the economy. Such an
open-textured statement is not highly controversial; controversy arises in
the identification of the content of fairness and in the means for
determining fairness. Nevertheless, initially casting the task in terms of
fairness would help us to follow the lead of John Rawls' social contract
analysis."' Under the Rawlsian approach, social and economic inequalities
are justified insofar as they help to raise the absolute level of the working
class's well-being and to transform the underclass into a prosperous
working class.' 9 The problem with this type of analysis, Gould might
respond, is that there is no standard for determining what constitutes a fair
share. Hence, labor's return must be determined in the collective
bargaining process by the relative strengths of the parties. Moreover, the
bargaining process absolves the government from responsibility for the
results and thus contributes to political stability. Experience shows,
however, that society does indeed have an interest in the results of the
bargaining process, and that, accordingly, it must accept some responsibility. Indeed, society's interest in the process and results of bargaining has
always been acknowledged in one way or another; as noted above,
Congress designed the Wagner Act in part as an income redistribution
measure.
The problems of the 1990s differ from those of the New Deal era.
The manufacturing sector of the American economy increasingly competes
in world markets and is subject to foreign competition in its home markets.
American society will prosper only as its products and services succeed in
the global marketplace. In this intensely competitive international
environment, labor's interests coincide with employers as never before.
This is the context of the new model of labor-management cooperation;
cooperation in fostering productivity is essential to economic success. Yet
the labor relations model spawned by the NLRA in a largely insulated
domestic market has not only been an adversarial model, but has failed in
other ways to foster productivity and competitiveness.
Under the NLRA, industry-wide unions have organized the
automobile, steel, textile, and other manufacturing industries. In each
industry, collective bargaining agreements between the companies and the
union have tended, in past years, to contain identical terms. In good years,

17. Id. at 120.
18. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
19. See William J. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underdass, and
Public Policy 122-24, 143-46 (1987) (viewing employment opportunities as the primary need of

the black poor).
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the industry-specific unions sought increased compensation on an hourlywage basis, which gradually transformed the profits of the most productive
industries into increasingly high hourly labor costs. In economic
downturns, wages were not adjusted downwards. The burden of the
downturn was felt in layoffs imposed upon the workers with the least
seniority. The system operated to ratchet money wages up to increasingly
higher levels and to provide effective lifetime job security to workers with
the greatest seniority. 0
This system has worked perversely in several ways. First, efficient
industries have been transformed over time into high wage-cost industries.
This effect was muted when American manufacturing firms competed
primarily in the domestic market where they all experienced the same
labor conditions. In a world of global competition, this effect transforms
comparative advantages initially held by American manufacturers into
comparative disadvantages with resulting injury to firms and their labor
forces.2 ' Professor Junichi Goto shows that the differential between the
wages of auto workers and the general manufacturing wage rate within the
United States is significantly higher than the comparable differential in
Japan. He explains how that larger differential has significantly
disadvantaged U.S. automobile manufacturers vis-A-vis their Japanese
competitors and has created significant structural unemployment in the
United States.2
Second, the high degree of employment security possessed by the
most senior workers combined with an ever-increasing hourly wage rate
isolates them from the factors that determine the fortunes of their
employers. This fosters a model of adversariness and confrontation in labor
relations. Commentators who praise Japanese industrial relations for
providing permanent employment often miss the fact that American firms
also provide permanent employment to those with the highest seniority. A
major difference, however, is that the Japanese system combines
employment security with fluctuating compensation tied to the fortunes of
the employer.2' Through this and other means, Japanese workers develop
an identification of interest with their employers. The Japanese model thus
avoids the traditional workplace hostility that infects American labor
relations.
Third, the industrial-union and hourly-wage-bargain model of labor
relations leaves out significant sectors of the work force and concentrates
the burdens of economic downturns on new entrants into the work force.

20.

See Daniel

J.

Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 Minn. L Rev.

1579, 1420, 1423 (1988) (describing the incentives and operation of collective bargaining as
structured in the United States).
21. Id. at 1423-25.
22. Junichi Goto, Labor in International Trade Theory. A New Perspective on JapaneseAmerican Issues passim (1990); see also id. at 59-61, 130, 135 (identifying the impact of the
different auto-worker and general-manufacturing pay differentials in the two nations).
23. See id. at 65.
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Restrictive employment conditions imposed for the benefit of workers with
the most seniority sacrifices employment for the younger generation and
other new entrants. Minorities, immigrants, and women, as the newest
population segments to enter the workforce, are the first to suffer when a
downturn in the business cycle occurs and are generally more likely to be
excluded from high-wage manufacturing industries. According to Professor
Weitzman, the fixed-hourly-wage model of compensation exaggerates the
effects of the business cycle on employment. 24 Moreover, a second tradeoff for artificially high wage differentials among industries is greater
structural unemployment.2
The United States should consider alternative models of labor
relations such as those suggested by the European experience. In some
countries of Europe, labor is organized across many industries. The
metalworkers unions of Germany and Sweden, for example, represent
workers in most of the manufacturing industries. Unions with wide
membership are more likely to seek wage increases in all, as opposed to
particular, industries. At least in Sweden, the unions have historically
pursued a "solidaristic wage policy" designed to narrow the wage gap
among workers in different industries.26 Under this policy, the profits of
efficient industries are not transformed by the collective bargaining process
into differentially higher hourly wages, thereby eroding their comparative
advantage in international trade.
Cross-industry unions may be a step towards single-union representation of the work force. A single union representing all workers would
drastically change the responsibilities and, consequently, the perspectives of
union leaders. The present system operates to skew union-bargaining goals
in favor of the most senior segment of each industry's work force with
results that are less than socially optimal. A responsibility to represent all
workers-including both the employed and unemployed across
industries-would shift the union's objectives in the direction of
maximizing labor's aggregate return, thus maximizing aggregate output.
Rational decisionmaking would move labor and management bargaining
towards a participatory model, permitting increasing amounts of
compensation in the form of bonuses or profit sharing. Compensation
would vary from industry to industry, but not due to rigidly set wage rates.
As a result, the market would allocate workers by skills. However, the
comparative advantages of efficient industries would be subject to less
erosion, and structural unemployment would be reduced.
In some European nations, the government takes an active role in
wage negotiations. This may be salutary. During the Kennedy Administra-

24. Martin L. Weitzman, The Share Economy 42-43 (1984).
25. See Goto, supra note 22, at 91.
26. See Robert J. Flanagan, Efficiency and Equality in Swedish Labor Markets, in The
Swedish Economy 125, 130-33 (Barry P. Bosworth & Alice M. Rivilin eds., 1987) (describing
the policies of the Swedish unions, including the solidaristic wage policy).
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tion the government actively sought, through wage-price guidelines and
persuasion, to hold the rate of wage increases to that of growth in
productivity. In so doing, the social interest in the wage bargain was
acknowledged. This interest lies not only in avoiding inflation (which was
the underlying concern of the Kennedy Administration), but also in
ensuring that profitable domestic industries remain internationally
competitive. Indeed, American workers themselves have a strong interest in
keeping their employers prosperous so that they may share in that
prosperity. The older adversarial model of labor and management relations
emphasizes conflicts in interest and obscures the shared goals of both
parties. That model makes it more difficult for labor to participate actively
with management in furthering efficiency and improving quality.
In the 1930s, the social interest lay in preserving industrial peace. In
the 1990s, the social interest includes expanding economic opportunity for
minorities and the poor, increasing labor participation in production
decisions, maintaining and furthering the competitiveness of industries
producing high-value-added products (because these industries provide
high-wage employment), and protecting the economy from wage-push
inflation. Both management and labor share these interests. The National
Labor Relations Act must be drastically revised to further these manifest
social needs.

